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This paper examines the information provided to the private sector by central banks. By 
using the principal component analysis, we investigated the variance of the procedural 
rules followed by nine major central banks about information treatments. We investigate 
problems related to the information coming from the central banks by focusing on the 
quantity and quality perspectives and highlight the methodological complexity of the 
investigation. We find that a synthetic quantitative index of transparency is not enough to 
represent the phenomenon since it can result misleading in understanding the behavior of 
institutionally different central banks associated with the same index values.  
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The issue of central bank transparency has recently acquired a growing importance in the 
macroeconomic literature on monetary policy. Reasons are of varied nature.  
On the one hand, it is generally acknowledged that significant suboptimal outcomes in 
the action of public authorities and institutions can be blamed to information asymmetries 
between authorities or institutions and the general public. Thus, an enquiry on the 
behavior regarding global information disclosure (transparency) could be important both 
on the positive side (helping to detect or explain major sources of non-market failures) 
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and on the normative side (pointing out the direction of some possible solution to those 
market failures).
1  
On the other hand, the problem of central bank transparency is relevant for the analysis 
and evaluation of monetary policy. There exist well known arguments generally favoring 
an explicit commitment by monetary authorities to a predefined course of action and/or a 
preference for a relevant degree of independence for the same institutions.
2 The 
commitment to particular policies should be supported and, thus, verifiable by the public. 
A particular attitude of the central bank towards information disclosure is hence required. 
Central bank independence poses analogous problems. A central bank endowed with 
strong independence from the control of other institutions could be tented to pursue goals 
different form social welfare improvement. Such a temptation could be higher the lower 
is the central bank’s transparency (and accountability).  
In order to develop the analysis of monetary authorities’ behavior towards information 
disclosure, apart from theoretical studies, an empirical appraisal of central banks’ 
transparency is certainly needed. This theme has been effectively tackled by several 
authors, (e.g. Bernake et al., 1999; Fry et al., 2000; and Blinder et al., 2001). In a recent 
contribution Eijffinger and Geraats, EG henceforth, (2002) propose an index explicitly 
built to summarize the information disclosure practices adopted by central banks. This 
                                                           
1 The importance of the openness of central bank decision making has been highlighted by, among the 
others, Blinder et al. (2001). However, following the seminal Canzoneri’s (1985) contribution, more recent 
theoretical studies emphasize the strategic use of information. See, e.g., Faust and Svensson (2001) and 
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not affect the average level of inflation and output gap, but it seems to have an effect on their volatilities.    
2 The arguments for commitment stem from Barro and Gordon (1983), while those for central bank 
independence (as long as it ensures a high degree of inflation aversion) are traditionally due to Rogoff 
(1985). Those issues have been extensively debated and the standard arguments supporting 
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general index is a highly composite one, made up of 15 different sub-indexes in order to 
include different facets of information disclosure;
3 it can be justified by reckoning that 
transparency or information disclosure are markedly multidimensional phenomena. EG 
then apply their index to nine major central banks for which it has been possible to collect 
the relevant information.
4 They find that the most transparent central banks are the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England, and the Swedish Riksbank. An 
intermediate level of transparency is associated with the Bank of Canada, the European 
Central Bank, and the US Federal Reserve. The least transparent central banks are the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank.  
Our aim is elaborate the EG’s analysis by investigating more deeply the multidimensional 
aspect of the problem. By applying principal component analysis (PCA) to the original 
EG’s dataset, we tackle a twofold target. First, by using a “non-centered” PCA, section 3 
refines the EG’s general index to eliminate some non-informative correlation between 
sub-indexes. Such a “cleaning” procedure generates a neater general index for 
transparency, which provides information on the absolute quantity of information 
disclosed by the central banks. Second, by using a “centered” PCA, we break down and 
recompose the original general EG’s index in order to single out different qualitative 
aspects of information disclosure behavior. This procedure gives rise to three specific 
indexes.
5 An analysis of the central banks’ scores under those indexes allows us to cluster 
                                                                                                                                                                             
others, Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994; Guzzo and Velasco, 1999; Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Berger et al., 
2001; and Lawler, 2001). 
3 See Appendix A.  
4 They first collected all the relevant information freely available in English as of in June 2001. Afterwards, 
for each central bank, they sent the scores obtained for that central bank (together with a description of the 
index) to an officer of the same institution, and asked for a review of the score itself. Finally, they used the 
responses to reassess and slightly modify the scores. Although the time span of the data collected is not 
clearly assessed, it can be thought that they cover a short-medium run period of some year. 
5 Which are determined by factorial axis, see Okamoto (1997) and Lebart et al. (1995).   4
the sample of monetary authorities in three groups, each characterized by composite and 
different characteristics under the multiple dimensions of transparency. Assuming that 
central bank can use information disclosure as a strategic variable, our findings are in line 
with some recent theoretical results relating transparency to other aspects of the 
institutional framework.
6 According to this strand of literature, an optimal level of 
transparency is not independent of the institutional features of the economic environment. 
Central banks might find optimal different degrees of transparency depending on the 
design of other institutions, such as the government budget stance, the industrial relation 
system, the financial market development, etc. Furthermore, our paper opens a new angle 
into the literature by suggesting that central banks confront a multidimensional problem 
when choosing their optimal transparency behavior. Besides choosing an overall 
quantitative level of transparency, monetary authorities must also decide the qualitative 
features and dimensions of their information disclosure.      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes EG’s dataset, also 
used in our study. Section 3, after explaining the difference between non-centered and 
centered PCA, illustrates our results in both cases and gives our interpretation of the 
principal components. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Transparency and the EG’s dataset 
In the construction of their index of transparency, EG (2002) follow this strategy: they 
assume that transparency is mainly given by the total amount of information that a central 
bank discloses to the public. Since such information can be of varied nature, they define 
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five major categories under which classifying the different types of transparency. 
Subsequently, each category is further partitioned into three specific values to obtain a 
finer classification of information flows. The five main categories are: 1) Political 
transparency; it refers to openness about policy objectives, i.e. the attitude of the central 
bank in communicating the form of its objective function, the values of its parameters and 
of its eventual target values for the main objective variable. 2) Economic transparency; 
it is related to information of economic nature, such as the adoption of a particular 
theoretical model of the economy, economic data and the knowledge of the shocks hitting 
the economy. 3) Procedural transparency; this is about the way monetary policy 
decisions are taken. It signals how the central bank discloses its strategy rule (e.g. a 
Taylor-kind rule) to the public. 4) Policy transparency; it involves the quickness in the 
communication of policy decision. Policy transparency is also about explanation of 
decision and clear indication for future policy actions. 5) Operational transparency; it 
refers to the implementation of monetary policy: the way in which policy actions are 
evaluated, eventual errors and disturbances, possible justifications (ex-post) of policy 
actions. Table 1 describes the complete structure of the sub-indexes: 
Table 1 – EG’s indexes 
Categories Sub-indexes  Description  Values 
Formal objectives  Explicit communication and/or prioritization of final 
targets.  1; 0,5; 0 
Quantitative targets  Presence of targets quantification.  1; 0  Political  
Institutional arrangements  Presence of explicit contracts between CB and 
government (e.g. instrument independence).  1; 0,5; 0 
Economic data  Provision of data on GDP, money supply, inflation, 
unemployment and capacity utilization.  1; 0,5; 0 
Policy models  Disclosure of the CB’s formal macro-model(s) used for 
policy analysis.  1; 0  Economic 
Internal forecasts  Regular communication or publication of CB’s forecasts.  1; 0,5; 0 
Procedural   Explicit strategy  Provision of a description of a CB’s policy rule 
(strategy).  1; 0   6
Minutes  Release of the decision boards minutes (in 8 weeks).  1; 0   
Voting records  Publication of voting records (in 8 weeks).  1; 0 
Prompt announcement  Decision on the main instruments or target announced at 
the latest day of implementation.  1; 0 
Policy explanation  Provision of explanations of CB’s announced decisions 
on targets/instruments.  1; 0,5; 0  Policy 
Policy inclination  Disclosure of CB’s likely future actions.  1; 0 
Control errors  Provision of explanation for eventual deviation from the 
targets.  1; 0,5; 0 
Transmission disturbances  Regular provision of information on disturbances 
affecting the transmission process.  1; 0,5; 0  Operational 
Evaluation of policy outcomes  Regular provision of CB’s evaluation in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives.  1; 0,5; 0 
 
The procedure of aggregation of the 15 sub-indexes followed by EG is straightforward: 
they simply sum up the indexes for each country.
7 Although the partition elaborated by 
EG is rather fine and comprehensive, the possibility of correlations between the recorded 
scores for each variable (sub-index) and the strong multidimensionality of the 
phenomenon calls for a further analysis. To this aim, the standard methods of multivariate 
eigenanalysis (the most classical of which is the PCA) appear particularly suited.   
 
3. The statistical model and results 
3.1 The methodology 
The main idea of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset that may contain 
correlated variables, while retaining as much as possible of its variability. More in detail, 
PCA searches for a few uncorrelated linear combinations (principal components) of the 
original variables that capture most of the information in the original variables.  
                                                           
7 See Appendix A: Table A1. The small number of monetary authorities considered in EG analysis (9 
central banks) could appear limiting. It can however be noticed that EG proceeded by collecting all the 
information easily and publicly available on central banks’ policies; so it can be argued that central banks   7
Suppose we want to measure people’s satisfaction with their lives. We design a 
satisfaction questionnaire with various items; among other things we ask our subjects 
how satisfied they are with their hobbies (item 1) and how intensely they are pursuing a 
hobby (item 2). Most likely, the responses to the two items are highly correlated with 
each other. Given a high correlation between the two items, we can conclude that the 
information provided by the two answers of the questionnaire is quite redundant.
8  
One can summarize the correlation between two variables in a scatter plot. A regression 
line can then be fitted that represents the best summary of the linear relationship between 
the variables. If we could define a variable that would approximate the regression line in 
such a plot, then that variable would capture most of the essence of the two items. 
Subjects’ single scores on that new factor, represented by the regression line, could then 
be used in future data analyses to represent that essence of the two items. In a sense we 
have rebuilt the two variables to one factor or component – the factor is in fact a vector 
made up of two numbers that can be conceived as weights on the former variables; see 
below. Note that the new factor is actually a linear combination of the two variables and 
its significance increases in the two-variable correlation.  
The example described above, combining two correlated variables into one factor, 
illustrates the basic idea of principal components analysis. If we extend the two-variable 
example to multiple variables, then the computations become more involved, but the 
basic principle of expressing two or more variables by a single factor remains the same. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not included in the dataset are (almost) completely opaque. Furthermore, the nine institutions covered by 
EG, put together, represent the most important and influential monetary policy makers at a global level. 
8 In a more extreme fashion, suppose to study the height of 100 people in inches and centimeters, so to have 
two variables that measure height. If in future studies, we want to research, for example, the effect of 
different nutritional food supplements on height, the use of both measures should be usefulness since height 
is one characteristic of a person, regardless of how it is measured. Hence variables can be redundant with 
respect to the information and, in some circumstances, a large number of indicator usefulness.    8
By considering more than two variables, we can think of them as defining a space, just as 
two variables defined a plane. Thus, when we have three variables, we could plot a three- 
dimensional scatter plot, and, again we could fit a plane through the data (a plane will 
individuate by two orthogonal lines). In principal components analysis, after the first 
factor has been extracted, that is, after the first line has been drawn through the data, we 
continue and define another line that best fits remaining variability, and so on. In this 
manner, consecutive factors are extracted.  
In order to fit the analysis in our context in a more precise way, consider the dataset 
organized in a matrix 
m n X
× ℜ ∈ , formed by n rows and m columns; in our case X would 
be the (transposed) data matrix in Table A1 (Appendix A) of the EG dataset: the rows of 
X represent the statistical units (central banks), while columns represent the variables 
(EG’s sub-indexes). As an example, assume to have (for simplicity) a smaller number of 
variables, say three variables named x, y, and z, coupled with many (say 30) central 
banks, i.e.  30 ; 3 = = n m . The scatter plot in Figure 1(a) represents the data (the 
Cartesian-axis X, Y, and Z represents the three variables; each point is a statistical unit, 
i.e. a central bank). As said before the aim of PCA is to reorganize information contained 
in the data cloud in an optimal way, i.e. by finding lines or factorial axis (the 
abovementioned components) like  ' b  i n  F i g u r e  1 ( a ) .
9 In order to fit data, such lines 
should minimize the square of distance of points like M from  ' b  (i.e. 
2 MH ), and this 
must hold for every point; in other words, they should minimize the sum of the squares of 
these distances. 
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Figure 1 – Scatter-plots with one and two factorial axis-components 
 




Points are all clustered in the nonnegative quadrant as the three variables can have only 
positive values. There can be more than one of vectors like  ' b , but we are interested in 
vectors that are independent one form the other
10 (i.e. orthogonal) – for instance, Figure 
1(b) depicts the case of a subspace individuated by two vectors  ' b  and  ' ' b , which is a 
plane (A) for the two vectors are orthogonal. 
Once calculated, each component b helps to explain a share of the total variability in the 
data, as each of the components is constructed so to best approximate the data cloud. It is 
possible to rank the components b by the (decreasing) magnitude of the share of variance 
explained (this is the meaning of the term principal components).
11 By construction, the 
elements of each vector b are nonnegative and sum up to one, so that they can be used as 
                                                           
10 More formally, it can be shown (see, e.g., Okamoto 1997; Lebart et al. 1995) that the problem of finding 
vectors b that minimize the squared distance of each points from the same vectors is equivalent to solve the 
following maximization problem:  Xb X b
T T max  w.r.t b, subject to the constraint  1 = b b
T  ( T indicate 
transposition). 
11 The first order conditions of the maximization problem give rises to the linear system:  b Xb X
T λ = , 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier (and the eigenvalue of the system). Each eigenvalue is associated with a   10
weighting coefficients in constructing new aggregate indexes for the original variables.
12 
A factorial axis can then be viewed as a vector of weights that can be applied to each row 
(central bank) of matrix X: summing up the variables scores in the row, weighted with the 
new coefficients, allows us to obtain a new synthetic indicator for the phenomenon under 
inquiry (transparency, in the present case). Each of these aggregate indexes provides a 
way to evaluate the global phenomenon under a particular perspective, which can be 
inferred from a qualitative interpretation (see below sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
The PCA can also be performed on the centered original data matrix (i.e. entries of matrix 
X are transformed in deviations from the mean of the variables). Centered analysis is 
obtained in a similar way as the non-centered one, above described, by using the 
transformed data set Y, where each entry is the deviation of the original datum form the 











. The difference between the two procedures is 
however not trivial and, being relevant for our investigation, we need to discuss it.
14  
Non-centered principal components analysis implies an all-zero point (vector) of 
reference: a non-transparent central bank. For example, the reference point is represented 
in figures 1 by the origin O, where the three original variables are equal to 0. By contrast, 
centering, or normalizing, by variables shifts the reference point (origin) to a hypothetical 
average stand. In other words, when centering is adopted, the analysis focuses on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
particular b (eigenvector) of the solution, and it can be shown that the sum of the eigenvalues is equal to the 
total variance of the data: thus each component b contribute to explain a share of the total variance. 
12 See, e.g., Dunteman (1989). 
13 Principal components can be also derived by centering the original data with respect to the variable 
(column) mean. 
14 Notice also that principal components are often calculated after data standardization. This procedure is 
needed when the variables are expressed in different units of measure. In our case, we do not standardize 
the data implicitly assuming the same metric used by EG.    11
eventual deviation from an “average” kind of central bank.
15  For example, the centering 
of data in Figure 1 would produce a shift in the origin before performing the PCA.  
The two procedures describe different situations. The decision about which is the more 
appropriate depends on the kind of variability that one wants to explain. An advantage of 
non-centered analysis is that it distinguishes disjunction from mere difference in between-
variables from within-variables heterogeneity of clusters. Within-variables heterogeneity 
means that the same set of variables is relevant to the explanation of the variability of all 
the clusters of central banks. When within variables heterogeneity is detected – e.g. when 
in the non centered PCA the weighting coefficients of the first component b are all 
positive – it means that the sample of central banks is rather homogeneous: it is 
influenced by the same set of variables in a uniform direction, and the sample doesn’t 
immediately splits into two (or more) clusters of central banks. Between-variables 
heterogeneity means that each cluster of central banks (or group of clusters) has 
significant non-zero values only on a subset of variables, i.e. the variability associated to 
each cluster is mainly explained by some variables only. On the other side, centered 
analysis generally allows for a more efficient concentration of information about 
between-variables information, so to extract more qualitative information in the resulting 
components. 
Our investigation strategy is as follows. First, we use a non-centered PCA to derive a 
quantitative index of transparency, which is comparable to that of EG. The advantage of 
obtaining an index in this way is clear with respect to a simple additive index. In fact, it 
eliminates redundant information in the dataset and gives additional information (e.g. the 
second component) about the phenomenon investigated, which could be useful to explain 
                                                           
15 Of course, information regarding the absolute values is not lost, but is synthesized in the means that in   12
the nature of information derived from the data. Second, we perform the PCA by 
centering the data with respect to variable means; this amount to implicitly accept EG 
index and study the variability of the data on their mean. This allows to us study the 
information provided by the central banks under a more qualitative perspective. 
3.2 Non-centered analysis 
The non-centered PCA individuates two principal components that explain about the 95% 
of the dataset variability. As usual in non-centered analysis, the first component explains 
a large part of the variability (85%). The second component, however, still explains about 
the 9% of data variability. The weights
16 (or loadings) associated with these two 
components (the first two vectors b of section 3.1) are reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 – Multivariate transparency indexes weights (first two components) 
  First component   Second component
Formal Objectives  0.304 0.119
Quantitative Targets  0.288 0.372
Institutional Arrangements  0.335 0.111
Economic Data  0.288 −0.001
Policy Models  0.210 −0.184
Central Bank Forecasts  0.246 −0.058
Explicit Strategy  0.288 0.372
Minutes 0.204 −0.487
Voting Records  0.158 −0.536
Prompt Announcement  0.352 −0.007
Policy Explanation  0.277 −0.036
Policy Inclination  0.082 −0.345
Control Errors  0.321 0.000
Transmission Disturbances  0.189 0.051
Evaluation Policy Outcome  0.166 −0.114
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
such a case have to be taken into account in the data analysis (see Noy-Meir, 1973). 
16 The software we used, MVSP, performs an R-mode PCA. The component loadings are scaled to unity, so 
that the sum of squares of an eigenvector equals one, and the component scores are scaled so that the sum 
of squares equals the eigenvalue.    13
The first component individuates a quantitative index, information sharing index ( IS 
index, or transparency index), which is comparable to that of EG.
17 The index differs 
from that of EG with respect to the weights (which in EG’s index are all the same). In our 
index  prompt announcement,  institutional arrangements,  control errors, and formal 
objectives are more relevant than in the EG’s index. By contrast, policy inclination, 
voting records, evaluation policy outcome, transmission disturbances result less relevant. 
Regarding the second component, a possible interpretation is to relate it to the relative 
quantity of information about the political transparency vs. the procedural 
transparency.
18 In fact, central banks that give relatively more quantitative information 
about their objective or reaction function (in terms of targets, form, or marginal rate of 
substitution) have high index values. By contrast, central banks disclosing more 
information about the way monetary policy decisions are taken (i.e. providing minutes 
and voting records) score low.
19 EG (2002) refer to explicit strategies as an indicator 
procedural transparency. By contrast, in our view it is an indicator of political 
transparency since it is related to the form of the policy function of the central bank (e.g. 
the adoption of a Taylor-kind rule to set monetary policy). We then refer to this index as 
procedural/political index (PP). 
By applying the weighting coefficients found above to the variables scores of each central 
bank, the latter can be ranked with respect to the two new aggregate indexes:  
Table 3 – Transparency indexes among industrialized countries 
                                                           
17 Recall that non-centered PCA explain the variability of the central banks with respect to the case of 
central bank associated with all zero score (i.e. a completely non transparent central bank). 
18 As defined by EG (2002), see our Section 2. 
19 More in detail, the second component is mainly determined (with a positive weight) by explicit strategy, 
quantitative targets, formal objectives, and institutional arrangements, and (with a negative weight) by the 
following variable voting records,  minutes,  policy inclination,  policy models, and evaluation policy 
outcome.   14
Information sharing (IS) index     Political/Procedural (PP) index 
New Zealand  1.198 (1.35)  Australia  0.334
UK 1.154 (1.25)  Switzerland  0.297
Sweden 1.153 (1.20)  Euro  zone  0.248
Canada 1.049 (1.05)  Canada 0.242
Euro zone  1.000 (1.00)  Sweden  0.113
US 0.856 (1.00)  UK  −0.114
Australia 0.845 (0.80)  New  Zealand  −0.252
Switzerland 0.801 (0.75)  Japan  −0.332
Japan 0.739 (0.80)  US  −0.554
 
The first index of Table 3 (IS) reflects the index of EG, which is indicated in the table 
between brackets (original EG index divided by 10 to facilitate the comparison).  
The second index (PP) indicates the kind of information that central banks supply about 
how monetary policy is set, as the ratio between information associated with the debate 
inside the central bank in the policymaking process (procedural transparency) and 
quantitative information associated with the central bank targets (political transparency). 
Countries such as the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom give a 
relative more relevance on the information related to the formation of the monetary 
policymaking process. By contrast, Australia, Switzerland, Canada, the European Central 
Bank, and Sweden place a more relative emphasis on the quantitative information 
regarding their targets.  
This subsection has investigated the variability of the data set with respect to the non-
transparent central bank, and therefore, it has focused on the quantity of information. 
According to our results, data are mainly associated with within-axes heterogeneity since 
the weights of first component are all positive, while those of the second component are 
also negative. This means that the same set of variables is relevant to all the clusters of 
central banks and (non-centered) principal components do not show the evidence of some 
interesting compositional disjunction in the sample. Hence, in order to understand and   15
describe the data variance under a more qualitative point of view, centered PCA may 
result more useful than the non-centered one.
20 In the next subsection, centered PCA by 
focusing on the quality of information tries to introduce an additional value to our 
investigation.  
3.3 Centered PCA 
The first three components of our centered PCA are reported in Table 4.
21 Since the first 
three eigenvalues explain about the 80% of the variance,
22 we can restrict our analysis to 
these components.  
Table 4 – Centered principal component analysis (weighting coefficients and components) 
  Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Formal Objectives  0.130 0.293 0.033
Quantitative Targets  0.384 0.360 −0.015
Institutional Arrangements  0.119 0.053 0.131
Economic Data  0.003 −0.205 −0.034
Policy Models  −0.172 0.477 −0.594
Central Bank Forecasts  −0.047 0.291 0.206
Explicit Strategy  0.384 0.360 −0.015
Minutes  −0.479 0.223 0.427
Voting Records  −0.530 0.135 0.057
Prompt Announcement  0.000 0.000 0.000
Policy Explanation  −0.030 0.024 −0.141
Policy Inclination  −0.341 0.140 −0.372
Control Errors  0.011 0.240 −0.098
Transmission Disturbances  0.061 0.334 0.432
Evaluation Policy Outcome  −0.107 0.199 0.212
 
The first component explains the 42% of the variance. It mainly depends on quantitative 
targets, explicit strategies, formal objectives, institutional arrangements (with positive 
contribution) and voting records, minutes, policy inclination (negative contribution).
23   
                                                           
20 See Noy-Meir (1973) for a more technical discussion about principal component analysis and between 
and within heterogeneity. 
21 Also for centered PCA holds the normalization adopted for the non-centered analysis of the previous 
section (see footnote 16). 
22 The relative contribution of each variable is reported in detail in Table B1: Appendix B.    16
Notice the correlation between the first component and the PP index of Table 2. Hence, 
our interpretation of the first component
24 is to see it as an index of the information on the 
“discussion process” that determines the monetary policy vs. the information on the final 
outcomes of this discussion process.
25 A central bank with a high score in the first 
component  ceteris paribus attaches proportionally a high importance on providing 
information on its formal objectives and institutional constraints, relative to the disclosure 
of the internal decision process outcomes. 
The second component groups with a positive sign policy models, forecasts, transmission 
disturbances, and control errors and it is negatively affected by only the variable 
economic data. Notice the correlation between this component and the IS index. It 
opposes central banks that give quantitative information about their reaction functions to 
central banks that do not do it. In fact the index is negatively associated with only 
economic data, which has a very low variability within central banks. 
The third component explains the 16% of the variance. It is mainly determined by 
transmission disturbances, minutes, and evaluation of policy outcomes (positive sign) and 
policy models, policy inclination, and policy explanation (negative sign). The first group 
of variables (positive) seems to be associated with the ex post appraisal of the monetary 
policy (operational transparency) whereas the second group (negative) can be related to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Relevant variables are determined by using a rule of thumb on their weight. However, principal 
component analysis can be also interpreted as a statistical model more than a merely descriptive one and 
relevance statistical determined (see Appendix C). 
24 The component interpretation has to be based on the correlations between the variables and the 
components themselves; these correlations can be obtained by direct calculation and are shown in 
Appendix B: Figure B1. 
25 According to our view in contrast with EG, the variable explained strategies plays a different role. It 
indicates the quick communication of the rules or strategies of the monetary policy. EG consider explained 
strategies as an indicator of the procedural transparency. In our case, it is more related to the political 
transparency if its relevance in the determination of the first component is considered (together with 
quantitative targets, explained strategies, formal objectives, and institutional arrangements).   17
the ex ante appraisal (policy transparency).
26 In general terms, it can be said that the 
former represents information relevant to understand the effects of monetary policy and 
the latter information useful to interpret the central bank’s strategies.  
Summarizing, the first component highlights the way used by the central banks to 
communicate their strategies. It opposes quantitative indexes to more articulated 
information, which can be used to indirectly determine the central banks’ strategies. The 
second component individuates central banks which provide quantitative data on their 
policy reaction function. It is related to the idea of transparency as the clear determination 
of the central bank’s targets (goal transparency). The third component indicates the 
information associated with the ex ante analysis of the monetary policy vs. its ex post 
analysis. According to the above view, we refer to the three found components as the 
strategy communication (SC)  index,  reaction parameter (RP)  index, and timing-of-
disclosure (TD) index, respectively. Table 5 reports them. 
 
Table 5 – Centered principal component analysis (indexes scores) 
  SC RP TD 
Australia 0.33 −0.11 0.02
Canada 0.25 0.06 −0.18
Euro zone  0.25 0.06 −0.16
Japan  −0.34 −0.34 0.25
New Zealand  −0.24 0.32 −0.10
Sweden 0.12 0.12 0.33
Switzerland 0.29 −0.30 −0.07
UK  −0.10 0.33 0.14
US  −0.56 −0.14 −0.24
 
Figure 2 describes the relationship between central banks and the first three components: 
 
 
                                                           
26 Notice that also minutes has a relevant weight in explaining the index. Minutes is also related to the 
policy transparency since it refers to the publication of board minutes in reasonable times.     18
Figure 2 – Central bank information (qualitative analysis) 
 
Legend: the horizontal axis represent SC, the vertical axis represent RP whereas the areas of pointers are correlated with the TD.  
 
An inspection of the above figure allows a tentative classification and interpretation of 
the nature of information provided by the nine central banks. By considering the first two 
components, there could be pointed out three groups of countries. 
A) A first group is formed by all central banks scoring a positive RP index. These 
central banks currently (or attempt to) pursue a commitment behavior by 
providing information on their reaction functions. Regarding the SC index they 
show not extreme absolute values. New Zealand and the United Kingdom have an 
established tradition of inflation targeting (a strong form of commitment). By 
contrast, Canada and Sweden are attempting to build a reputation on a credible 
inflation targeting regime. This explains the relative difference in the SC index; in 
fact, Canada and Sweden focus their relative information on the quantitative 
variables.  European Union can be also included in this group as it also attempts 
to increase its reputation in order to establish commitment regime although 
without a formal inflation targeting.
27 
                                                           
27 Inflation targeting regime is not the only form of commitment for a central bank.   19
B)  Other central banks are more extreme regarding the SC index. The United States 
and Japan form another group. Their information disclosure appears coherent with 
a general propensity for discretion in the monetary policy. In fact, they show low 
levels of the indexes. As for the SC index their information policy appears 
relatively more oriented to explaining the monetary strategies without providing 
the quantitative variables. However, the RP index signals that their information 
policy is procedural-oriented not only in relative terms but also in absolute ones, 
since the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan provide low quantitative data 
on their policy reaction function. 
C)  The last group is formed by Australia and Switzerland. The information 
disclosure associated with these central banks appears somehow unbalanced. 
They provide relatively more information on political transparency than on 
procedural transparency, but are associated with poor scores in the provision of 
information regarding quantitative data of their policy. Hence they can be 
associated with a low standard of general transparency. 
The above grouping of countries well-describe the relation between central banks and 
information disclosure focusing on the different monetary policy regime (i.e. 
discretionary or commitment). However, the third component (TD index) helps to point 
out a further dimension of the information disclosure, transversal with respect to our 
grouping. Countries as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan, which for mandatory or 
cultural reasons are more inclined to be involved in a more general (coordinate) setting of 
the economic policy, show higher values of the TD index, as result of the ex post 
evaluation of the monetary policy. It could be thought that in a centralized economic   20
policy framework
28 an ex post revision of the policy measures on the basis of their effects 
is needed. The lack of a fiscal coordination among the European Union members seems 
to confirm our intuition. The European Central Bank scores low TD index, hence it 
provides more ex ante information than ex post as expected if coordination is not present 
(an analogous claim can be made for the United States).  
Finally, the proposed centered PCA should be evaluated with respect to the quality of the 
representation on the chosen factorial axis. The inspection of the total absolute 
contribution and of the representation quality sufficiently confirms the validity of the 
centered PCA (see Appendix C). With respect to the first component, it should be noticed 
the particular weight of the United States that contributes to explain the variance of the 
first component about for 37%. This is confirmed also by a visual inspection of Figure 2, 
in which the position of the United States appears to be rather an outlier. Anyway, the 
impact of the United States is not outside the usual range accepted for this kind of 
analysis. For the second and third component, the impact of the various countries is more 
evenly distributed.
29 
Although the aim of the present paper is a rather descriptive (or positive) one, provided of 
our description of transparency universe, we can also attempt to give some normative 
interpretations of our results. The second index clearly reflects the institutional 
framework of central banks following two different strategies: commitment and 
                                                           
28 That could also involve social partners, as, e.g., centralized trade unions and business organizations. 
29 As for the representation quality, the first three components absorb a significant percentage of the 
variance among the countries, ranging form a minimum of 69% for Australia to a maximum of 96% for the 
United States. This confirms the quality of the representation assured by the first three components. The 
results of the PCA highly depends upon the structure of the data matrix (see Table A1: Appendix A), a 
direct inspection of this dataset shows the relative low impact of certain variables, due to their uniformity of 
distribution among countries. For instance, prompt announcement plays no role, for its score is one for all 
the countries. Similarly, institutional arrangements, quantitative targets and control errors have only a 
minor impact for they are quite evenly distributed among countries.   21
discretionary, since commitment requires information about the policy function (and 
credibility). The y-axis of Figure 2 clearly distinguishes the two kind of central bank.   
It is useful to compare the ranking of the two largest central banks: the European Central 
Bank and US Federal Reserve. These central banks are very active in promoting their 
transparency degree. Greesnpan (2001), for example, recalls that in the 1980s central 
bankers reckon that financial markets work more efficiently when effort need not be 
wasted to infer the stance of monetary policy. Similar statements are provided by ECB 
staff. However, notwithstanding the efforts of their personnel, in our analysis their 
records are rather poor.
30 Both central banks do not provide a great amount of 
information, in particular, information on their policy rule (this hardly contrasts with the 
Greesnpan’s claim above). Both are more active to provide ex ante information instead of 
ex post information raising a problem of accountability. In fact, ex ante information 
might be used strategically whereas ex post information is more useful to evaluate the 
central bank policy.
31 This point seems to be particularly relevant for the European 
Central Bank. The two central banks only differ for the kind of information that they 
produce: that of the European Central Bank is more elaborated than the information 
coming from the Federal Reserve. 
                                                           
30 Because its supranational nature, the European Central Bank – as recently stressed by a CEPR report by 
(2000) – faces also the additional problem of a tension within Europe between the desire for more 
integration and a reluctance to cede national political control. For example, attributing votes and opinions 
to members from different countries would increase the focus on national differences, and so undermine the 
bank's credibility. The CEPR report considers ways to reduce this tension. First, the European Central Bank 
should be set an explicit inflation target by the European Parliament, so there can be no disagreement about 
the goal of monetary policy. Second, it recommends that the power of the executive board be increased 
relative to that of national central-bank governors, who are more likely to be influenced by national 
interests. At the moment, all 11 governors can vote, outweighing the six-member executive board. Better, 
perhaps, if only five, say, were allowed to vote at any time, with revolving terms –like the arrangements for 
district-bank presidents in America’s Federal Reserve System. 
31 The problem is even more serious since both central banks, as said, do not clearly explain their strategies.    22
Finally, we should consider the recent experience of Japanese monetary policy. Japan is 
probably the worst mix of our index. No information based on rules or targeting is 
provided associated with a low general level of information that might be manipulated 
(ex ante information). Among other things, according to Posen (1997), Japan can be seen 
as an example of the dangers of a lack of monetary transparency. Monetary policy in 
Japan – since the structural change following the burst asset price bubble – has given the 
public no explicit announcement of its goals. Hence, every time the Bank of Japan has 
moved interest rates or left them steady, no one could tell whether the monetary-policy 
orientation was due to political pressure from the Ministry of Finance or financial 
interests, a reassessment of the growth and inflation forecasts, or an extended 
displacement of macroeconomic goals in pursuit of renewed financial stability. The 
inability of markets and businesses to guess the future stance of Japanese monetary policy 
not only had direct negative effects on investment and spending, this uncertain response 
interfered with the transmission of monetary policy in an environment where 
expansionary monetary policy could have benefited from a larger impact. This 
uncertainty can be a more likely explanation for the relative ineffectiveness of the Bank 
of Japan’s interest rate cuts to stimulate the economy than appeals to a nominal interest 
rate floor at zero percent. Moreover, without a target there was no clear floor for inflation 
below which the Japanese operators could know the central bank would not allow the 
price-level to drop. Deflation occurred. 
 
 
4. Conclusions   23
Although the presumption today is that — absent compelling reasons to the contrary — 
central banks should strive for transparency, some basic questions about what, how, and 
to what end central banks should communicate with the public remain decidedly open. In 
the economic and political debates, the word “transparency” is commonly used in a vague 
and often contradictory terms. The academic literature on transparency in monetary 
policy making tried to give some precision to the term “transparency”. However, it has 
largely done so in the context of models, which do not allow the critical issue of how best 
to communicate monetary policy to be addressed in a satisfactory way or how central 
bank effectively communicate. 
Aimed to qualify the transparency definition, in this paper we have investigated the 
information provided by the central bank to the public on both a quantitative and a 
qualitative side. We found that a simple index as that developed by EG (refined in our 
non centered PCA by the IS general index) performs well in synthesizing information 
about the general quantity of transparency. However, being the information strategic, 
single indexes are not sufficient to fully understand the central bank’s information 
disclosure. Once we recognize that we are in a world where computational constraints 
and cognitive limits matter, more information and greater detail may in fact no longer 
necessarily translate into greater transparency. Hence, together with the quantity, the 
quality issue matters: multiple indexes are needed.  
In particular, by running a qualitative analysis (namely centered PCA) we individuate 
three indexes that better characterize central banks’ behavior and explain some difference 
in the information that they produce. The use of these refined indexes allows us to 
disentangle aspects of central banks’ behavior that can be related to the institutional   24
framework in which they operate and to other structural characteristics of monetary 
policy making. By taking account of these indexes, the nine central banks considered in 
our study can be clustered into three groups with respect to the monetary policy regime 
adopted and further differentiated according to the general propensity of policy 
coordination due to cultural or political reasons. We shows that central bank provide very 
different information in terms of both quantity and quality. This observation raises 
important theoretical and practical questions. By considering the information provided by 
the central bank as an endogenous choice of the same central bank, analysts should be 
able to develop theories that can explain the different behavior and wandering against 
policy implication coming from simple representation of the real world. According to us, 
the empirical analysis of previous sections supports the view that information disclosure 
in monetary policy setting is significantly related to the overall economic and institutional 
environment; different attitudes towards transparency probably reflect different 
constraints and features of national (or economic areas) economic and policy 
frameworks. By considering information as the results of an institutional design, it raises 
the question of the optimality of the central bank design and the costs associated with 
different designs. The grouping of central banks highlighted in our multivariate analysis 
suggests that the optimal choice of transparency should be influenced by other structural 
political-economic characteristics in a definite way.  Such remark, together with the fact 
that our indexes are by construction uncorrelated, suggests to use the latter in further 
empirical studies as panel or cross-country econometric investigations aimed to test the 
contrasting theoretical implications of different models.
32 
                                                           
32 See for instance Ciccarone et al. (2004), where optimal choice of transparency degree is studied in a 
game-theoretic model encompassing the behavior of wage setters and fiscal policy authorities.   25
Our analysis is a step further in the recent transparency debate by highlighting the 
quantitative perspective from an empirical point of view. Regarding our further steps 
toward, we aim to investigate more in general the variability of central bank procedures 
regarding not only transparency but also accountability and independence in order to 
better understand the central bank institutional design.      26
Appendix A – Dataset and data matrices 
Table A1 – Dataset (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002) 
 Aus  Can Eur Jap  NZ  Swe Swi  UK  US 
Formal  Objectives  1 1 1  0.5 1 1  0.5 1  0.5 
Quantitative  Targets  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Institutional  Arrangements  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0.5 
Economic  Data  0.5 1 1 1  0.5 1 1  0.5 1 
Policy  Models  0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Central  Bank  Forecasts  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  1  1 0.5  1 0.5 
Explicit  Strategy  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Minutes  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Voting  Records  0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Prompt  Announcement  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Policy  Explanation  0.5 1  0.5  0.5 1 1 1  0.5 1 
Policy  Inclination  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Control  Errors  1 1 1  0.5 1 1  0.5 1 1 
Transmission  Disturbances 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 1 0 1 0 
Evaluation  Policy  Outcome  0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  1  0 0.5 0.5 
Legend. Aus: Australia; Can: Canada; Eur: Euro Zone; Jap: Japan; NZ: New Zealand; Swe: Sweden; UK: United 
Kingdom; US: United States. 
Table A2 – Centered data form Table A1 
  Aus Can Eur  Jap  NZ Swe Swi  UK  US 
Formal  Objectives  0,166 0,166 0,166  -0,333 0,166 0,166  -0,333 0,166  -0,333 
Quantitative  Targets  0,222 0,222 0,222  -0,777 0,222 0,222 0,222 0,222  -0,777 
Institutional  Arrangements  0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055  -0,444 
Economic  Data  -0,333 0,166 0,166 0,166  -0,333 0,166 0,166  -0,333 0,166 
Policy  Models  -0,555  0,444  0,444 -0,555  0,444 -0,555 -0,555  0,444  0,444 
Central  Bank  Forecasts  -0,166 -0,166 -0,166 -0,166  0,333  0,333 -0,166  0,333 -0,166 
Explicit  Strategy  0,222 0,222 0,222  -0,777 0,222 0,222 0,222 0,222  -0,777 
Minutes  -0,555 -0,555 -0,555  0,444  0,444  0,444 -0,555  0,444  0,444 
Voting  Records  -0,444 -0,444 -0,444  0,555  0,555 -0,444 -0,444  0,555  0,555 
Prompt  Announcement  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Policy  Explanation  -0,277 0,222  -0,277  -0,277 0,222 0,222 0,222  -0,277 0,222 
Policy  Inclination  -0,222 -0,222 -0,222 -0,222  0,777 -0,222 -0,222 -0,222  0,777 
Control  Errors  0,111 0,111 0,111  -0,388 0,111 0,111  -0,388 0,111 0,111 
Transmission  Disturbances  0 0 0 0 0  0,5  -0,5  0,5  -0,5 
Evaluation  Policy  Outcome  -0,444  0,0556 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,555  -0,444 0,055 0,055 
Table A3 – Similarity matrix (non-centered PCA) 
  FO QT IA ED  PM  CBF  ES M VR PA PE PI CE TD  EPO 
F O   0 . 8 4 4                 
QT  0.813  0.875               
IA  0.906  0.875  1.031              
ED  0.750  0.688  0.875  0.844             
PM  0.563  0.500  0.563  0.500  0.625            
CBF  0.656  0.625  0.719  0.594  0.438  0.563           
ES  0.813 0.875 0.875 0.688 0.500 0.625 0.875                 
M  0.500 0.375 0.563 0.500 0.375 0.500 0.375 0.625               
VR  0.375 0.250 0.438 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.250 0.500 0.500             
PA  0.938 0.875 1.063 0.938 0.625 0.750 0.875 0.625 0.500 1.125           
PE  0.719 0.688 0.813 0.750 0.500 0.594 0.688 0.500 0.375 0.875 0.750         
PI  0.188 0.125 0.188 0.188 0.250 0.188 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250       
CE  0.875 0.813 0.938 0.813 0.625 0.688 0.813 0.563 0.438 1.000 0.781 0.250 0.938     
TD  0.531 0.500 0.563 0.438 0.313 0.438 0.500 0.375 0.250 0.563 0.406 0.063 0.531 0.406   
EPO  0.438 0.375 0.469 0.438 0.313 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.250 0.500 0.406 0.125 0.469 0.313 0.313 
Legend. FO: formal objectives, QT: quantitative targets; IA: institutional arrangements; ED: economic data; PM: policy 
models; CBF: central bank forecasts; ES: explicit strategy; M: minutes; VR: voting records; PA: prompt announcement; 
PE: policy explanation; PI: policy inclination; CE: control errors; TD: transmission disturbances; and EPO: evaluation 
policy outcomes. 
Table A4 – Covariance matrix (centered PCA)   27
  FO QT IA ED  PM  CBF  ES M VR PA PE PI CE TD  EPO 
F O   0 . 0 6                 
QT  0.08  0.19               
IA  0.02  0.05  0.03              
ED  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0.06             
PM  0.04  0.01  -0.03  -0.02  0.28            
CBF  0.03 0.04 0.01  -0.03 0.02 0.06                   
ES  0.08 0.19 0.05  -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.19                 
M  -0.02  -0.11  -0.03  -0.02  0.03  0.08  -0.11  0.28         
VR  -0.04  -0.14  -0.04  -0.04 0.10 0.04  -0.14 0.22 0.28             
PA  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00           
PE  -0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.07         
PI  -0.02  -0.07  -0.05  -0.02 0.11 0.02  -0.07 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.19       
CE  0.04 0.04  -0.01  -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05     
TD  0.06 0.06 0.03  -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00  -0.03  -0.06 0.03 0.13   
EPO  0.02  -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04  -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.09 
 
Appendix B – Centered PCA 
The principal components in the centered PCA (the first three of which are shown in 
Table 4) are obtained as eigenvectors b of the equation:  b Xb X
T λ = , where 
T X  is the 
centered data matrix of Table A2; the resulting eigenvalues λ  are shown in Tab. B1 (the 
last seven eigenevalues are all zero) 
 
Table B1 - Eigenvalues of matrix  X X



















Eigenvalues  0,827 0,466 0,317 0,145  0,14  0,05  0,012 0,009 
Percentage  42,072  23,711  16,108  7,391 7,117 2,551 0,615 0,436 
Cum.  Percent.  42,072 65,783 81,891 89,282 96,399 98,949 99,564  100 
 
The above mentioned problem has a dual in the space of the units, i.e.  c c XX
T µ = , so 
that λ  and µ  are identical. An indication of the correlation between variables (columns 
of X) can be obtained by the definition of the components c in the space of the units (cfr. 
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where  j s  is the standard deviation of variable j computed form Table A1. Figure B1 plots 
the values of  ) ( j cα  for the two first eigenvalues (1st and 2nd Components in Table B1): 
   28
Figure B1 – Non-centered principal component analysis (Euclidean biplot) 
 
Variables which span a small angle with the first component (axis)  1 b  are those more 
correlated with the same factorial axis, and determine the interpretation of the latter. 
 
Appendix C – Total contributions and representation quality for centered PCA 
The main instrument to control the quality of a PCA are the Total absolute contribution 























where  ) (i cα  is the score of country i under the α -th component. It explains how much of 
the variance explained by the α  component is due to the i-th unit, so signaling potentials 
outliers. Table C1 shows the TAC values for the first eight non zero components.   29
Table C1 – TAC values for the centered PCA  
  Axis 1  Axis 2  Axis 3  Axis 4  Axis 5  Axis 6  Axis 7  Axis 8 
Australia  0,132480 0,026918 0,001817 0,081938 0,132114  0,48672 0,010083 0,016000 
Canada  0,073175 0,007725 0,102208 0,006628 0,158579  0,02738 0,002083 0,484000 
EU  0,076788 0,006730 0,075789 0,038793 0,201600  0,00288 0,147000 0,324000 
Japan  0,140606 0,242266 0,194019 0,089628 0,021607  0,01800 0,147000 0,036000 
New  Zealand  0,069649 0,225270 0,030297 0,024007 0,266064  0,00242 0,261333 0,009000 
Sweden  0,017704 0,028876 0,347710 0,420752 0,035000  0,02178 0,005333 0,011111 
Switzerland  0,101693 0,189290 0,016353 0,032834 0,171607  0,30258 0,033333 0,040111 
UK  0,012828 0,232277 0,057492 0,256890 2,86E-05  0,07200 0,252083 0,009000 
US  0,375150 0,041461 0,174211 0,049828 0,014464  0,06962 0,147000 0,018778 

















where p is the number of the significant eigenvalues λ  considered in the analysis. It 
gives a measure for contribution of the α -th factor in the representation (or explanation) 
of the i-th element. The RQ values for the centered PCA are given in Table C2: 
Table C2 – RQ values for the centered PCA  
  Axis 1  Axis 2  Axis 3  Axis 4  Axis 5  Axis 6  Axis 7  Axis 8 
Australia  0,616693 0,070607 0,003242 0,066875  0,10411 0,136982 0,000681 0,000811 
Canada  0,482476 0,028702 0,258316 0,007662 0,177002 0,010915 0,000199 0,034729 
EU  0,490993 0,024247 0,185754 0,043491 0,218219 0,001113 0,013639 0,022546 
Japan  0,375475 0,364545 0,198599 0,041965 0,009768 0,002906 0,005696 0,001046 
New  Zealand  0,266361 0,485443 0,044412 0,016097 0,172251 0,000560 0,014502 0,000375 
Sweden  0,071252 0,065485 0,536414 0,296905 0,023846 0,005300 0,000311 0,000487 
Switzerland  0,378541 0,397036 0,023334 0,021430 0,108138 0,068097 0,001800 0,001625 
UK  0,058602 0,597904 0,100672 0,205757 2,21E-05 0,019886 0,016710 0,000447 
US  0,776673 0,048368 0,138249 0,018087 0,005069 0,008714 0,004416 0,000423 
 
Appendix D – Centered principal component analysis: The statistical model
33 
Principal component analysis is a descriptive tool. However, it can also be interpreted as 
a statistical model, and therefore, its asymptotic standard errors for covariance matrix and 
the percentage of explained variance can be computed.
34 
The principal component model can be written in matrix terms as: 
ε + =
T AB X  
where 
m n X
× ℜ ∈  is the matrix of observations, 
f n A
× ℜ ∈  is a matrix of factor scores, 
f m B
× ℜ ∈  is a matrix of factor loadings, and 
m n× ℜ ∈ ε  is a matrix of (normal distributed) 
residuals. In the principal component analysis model, A are unknown parameters (fixed 
effects) to be estimated, and so X i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  b e l o n g  t o  b e  o f  r a n k  k computes 
asymptotic standard errors of the principal components model for covariance and 
correlation matrices and the percentage of explained variance.  
                                                           
33 Principal components are computed by using STATA with a freeware ado-file written by Jeroen Weesie 
(Department of Sociology, Utrecht University) and MVSP of Kovach Computers.   
34 See Anderson (1963) and Tyler (1981).     30
Identification and parameterization of rank models is non-trivial. Let 
f f L
× ℜ ∈  be a 
regular (invertible) matrix, then 
) )( (
1 T T B L AL AB
− =  
Thus, there is considerable freedom to transform (“rotate”) A and B into a standardized 
format. We use an identifying restriction that B is row-wise orthogonal, i.e., the columns 
of B have norm 1, and are uncorrelated with each other. 
Principal component analysis are computed as maximum-likelihood estimators based on 
the assumption that the εij are independently and identically normal distributed with a 
common variance σ (see Andersen, 1963). Estimates may be sensitive to violations of the 
normality assumption, and therefore, asymptotic results should be interpreted cautiously. 
Results of principal component analysis are reported in the following tables. Prompt 
Announcement has been removed since its variability in the sample is zero. 
Table D1 – Principal components of covariance matrix 
Components  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Eigenvalues  0.827 0.466 0.317 0.145 0.140 0.050 0.012 0.009 
%  of  var  explained  0.421 0.237 0.161 0.074 0.071 0.026 0.006 0.004 
cum  %  of  var  explained 0.421 0.658 0.819 0.893 0.964 0.990 0.996 1.000 
Standard  errors  0.130 0.098 0.060 0.041 0.015 0.004 0.002 0.000 
Number of observations 14, number of factors 4 (ρ = 0.893%, std err 0,041) 
Notice that components from 9 to 14 are ruled out since the first 8 components explain about the 100% of the variance. 
Standard errors are based on multivariate normality. 
 
Table D2 (a) – First component (detail) 
  coefficient  std err  Z  P>|z|  95% confidence interval 
Formal  Objectives  -0.130 0.172 -0.755 0.451 -0.467 0.207 
Quantitative  Targets  -0.384 0.212 -1.810 0.070 -0.799 0.032 
Institutional  Arrangements  -0.119 0.065 -1.821 0.069 -0.247 0.009 
Economic  Data  -0.003 0.148 -0.017 0.986 -0.294 0.288 
Policy  Models    0.172 0.348   0.494 0.621 -0.510 0.854 
Central Bank Forecasts   0.047  0.185   0.256  0.798  -0.315  0.409 
Explicit  Strategy  -0.384 0.212 -1.810 0.070 -0.799 0.032 
Minutes   0.479  0.195   2.451  0.014   0.096  0.861 
Voting Records   0.530  0.115   4.628  0.000   0.306  0.755 
Prompt  Announcement    0.030 0.119   0.248 0.804 -0.204 0.263 
Policy  Explanation    0.341 0.174   1.953 0.051 -0.001 0.682 
Policy  Inclination  -0.011 0.152 -0.071 0.943 -0.308 0.286 
Control  Errors  -0.061 0.244 -0.249 0.803 -0.540 0.418 
Transmission Disturbances   0.107  0.166   0.645  0.519  -0.218  0.431 
Evaluation  Policy  Outcome  -0.130 0.172 -0.755 0.451 -0.467 0.207 
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Table D2 (b) –Second component (detail) 
  coefficient  std err  z  P>|z|  95% confidence interval 
Formal Objectives   0.293  0.094   3.103  0.002   0.108  0.478 
Quantitative  Targets    0.360 0.232   1.551 0.121 -0.095 0.816 
Institutional Arrangements   0.053  0.142   0.371  0.710  -0.226  0.332 
Economic  Data  -0.205 0.144 -1.425 0.154 -0.487 0.077 
Policy  Models    0.477 0.534   0.893 0.372 -0.570 1.525 
Central Bank Forecasts   0.291  0.188   1.549  0.121  -0.077  0.660 
Explicit Strategy   0.360  0.232   1.551  0.121  -0.095  0.816 
Minutes    0.223 0.461   0.483 0.629 -0.681 1.126 
Voting Records   0.135  0.334   0.403  0.687  -0.520  0.790 
Prompt  Announcement    0.024 0.210   0.113 0.910 -0.388 0.436 
Policy  Explanation    0.140 0.400   0.349 0.727 -0.645 0.925 
Policy Inclination   0.240  0.115   2.092  0.036   0.015  0.465 
Control  Errors    0.334 0.378   0.884 0.377 -0.407 1.076 
Transmission Disturbances   0.199  0.245   0.812  0.417  -0.281  0.680 
Evaluation Policy Outcome   0.293  0.094   3.103  0.002   0.108  0.478 
 
Table D2 (c) – Third component (detail) 
  coefficient  std err  z  P>|z|  95% confidence interval 
Formal  Objectives    0.033 0.263   0.124 0.901 -0.484 0.549 
Quantitative  Targets  -0.015 0.352 -0.042 0.967 -0.704 0.675 
Institutional Arrangements   0.131  0.095   1.381  0.167  -0.055  0.318 
Economic  Data  -0.034 0.276 -0.124 0.901 -0.575 0.507 
Policy  Models  -0.594 0.457 -1.300 0.194 -1.490 0.302 
Central Bank Forecasts   0.206  0.265   0.777  0.437  -0.314  0.726 
Explicit  Strategy  -0.015 0.352 -0.042 0.967 -0.704 0.675 
Minutes    0.427 0.265   1.611 0.107 -0.093 0.946 
Voting Records   0.057  0.289   0.196  0.845  -0.510  0.623 
Prompt  Announcement  -0.141 0.261 -0.540 0.589 -0.653 0.371 
Policy  Explanation  -0.372 0.273 -1.361 0.174 -0.907 0.164 
Policy  Inclination  -0.098 0.230 -0.427 0.669 -0.550 0.353 
Control  Errors    0.432 0.306   1.411 0.158 -0.168 1.032 
Transmission Disturbances   0.212  0.291   0.727  0.467  -0.359  0.783 
Evaluation Policy Outcome   0.033  0.263   0.124  0.901  -0.484  0.549 
 
Table D2 (d) –Fourth component (detail) 
  coefficient  std err  z  P>|z|  95% confidence interval 
Formal  Objectives  -0.049 0.633 -0.077 0.938 -1.290 1.192 
Quantitative  Targets    0.071 2.223   0.032 0.975 -4.287 4.428 
Institutional  Arrangements  -0.104 0.512 -0.203 0.839 -1.108 0.900 
Economic Data   0.296  3.674   0.081  0.936  -6.905  7.498 
Policy  Models  -0.225 3.712 -0.061 0.952 -7.499 7.050 
Central Bank Forecasts   0.137  1.397   0.098  0.922  -2.600  2.875 
Explicit Strategy   0.071  2.223   0.032  0.975  -4.287  4.428 
Minutes    0.204 0.600   0.340 0.734 -0.972 1.380 
Voting  Records  -0.397 2.118 -0.188 0.851 -4.548 3.753 
Prompt  Announcement    0.598 0.953   0.627 0.530 -1.270 2.466 
Policy  Explanation    0.351 3.296   0.106 0.915 -6.109 6.811 
Policy Inclination   0.055  1.134   0.049  0.961  -2.167  2.277 
Control  Errors  -0.122 1.993 -0.061 0.951 -4.028 3.783 
Transmission Disturbances   0.349  4.011   0.087  0.931  -7.512  8.211 
Evaluation  Policy  Outcome  -0.049 0.633 -0.077 0.938 -1.290 1.192 
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